tavily_crawl
on npm:tavily-mcp@0.2.20
Severity
4 findings on this tool
- highexcessive agencyf-r4-tavily_crawl
Tool `tavily_crawl` accepts an unbounded monetary / quota value
The numeric parameter(s) `limit` have a money/quota-shaped name but no `maximum` constraint. An LLM tricked by indirect-injection can call the tool with arbitrarily large values.
fix: Add a `maximum` (and ideally `minimum`) to each money/quota numeric, OR enforce the cap via a capframe-bind `--limit` caveat at the agent boundary.
OWASP LLM08NIST MANAGE-2.2ATLAS T0051CAST-01 - highssrf surfacef-r8-tavily_crawl
Tool `tavily_crawl` accepts an unconstrained URL / endpoint parameter
The parameter(s) `url` look like URL or endpoint inputs but carry no `pattern` or `enum` constraint. An agent tricked by an indirect-injection payload can invoke this tool with an internal-service URL (e.g. `http://169.254.169.254/`) to exfiltrate cloud metadata, probe internal APIs, or pivot to services the host can reach but the caller cannot.
fix: Constrain the URL parameter with an allow-list `enum`, or a `pattern` that restricts scheme and domain. Validate server-side against an allow-list and reject private / loopback / link-local address ranges at the HTTP client level.
OWASP LLM07NIST MANAGE-2.2ATLAS T0051CAST-02 - mediumunconstrained inputf-r1-tavily_crawl
Tool `tavily_crawl` accepts unconstrained string input
The following string parameter(s) have no `maxLength` constraint: `instructions`, `url`. Unbounded strings let an attacker stuff arbitrary payloads through the tool, including indirect-injection content.
fix: Add a `maxLength` to each string property, or constrain with an `enum` or `pattern`. Most legitimate tool inputs fit under a few hundred bytes.
OWASP LLM01NIST MEASURE-2.3ATLAS T0051CAST-03 - mediumindirect injectionf-r6-tavily_crawl
Tool `tavily_crawl` fetches external web content -- indirect-injection surface
Description: "Crawl a website starting from a URL. Extracts content from pages with configurable depth and breadth." -- this tool pulls externally-controlled content into the agent's context window, the canonical indirect-injection vector. Even when the user supplies the URL, content at that URL can carry hostile instructions.
fix: Sandbox the fetched content: strip prompts before forwarding to the model, constrain to an allow-list of domains, and route through capframe-guard with a `domain in [...]` caveat.
OWASP LLM01NIST MEASURE-2.3ATLAS T0051CAST-02
About this tool
tavily_crawl is one of 5 tools exposed by tavily-mcp. The server scored 72/100 overall against the capframe rule engine (source: sandbox). Last scanned 2026-07-20.
The findings above are emitted by the public capframe.findings.v1 schema. Disagree with one? Open an issue.