server-postgres
npm:@modelcontextprotocol/server-postgres@0.6.2
Severity breakdown
Worst finding
Tool `query` accepts unconstrained string input
· query
The following string parameter(s) have no `maxLength` constraint: `sql`. Unbounded strings let an attacker stuff arbitrary payloads through the tool, including indirect-injection content.
fix: Add a `maxLength` to each string property, or constrain with an `enum` or `pattern`. Most legitimate tool inputs fit under a few hundred bytes.
All 1 finding
- mediumTool `query` accepts unconstrained string input· queryunconstrained input
The following string parameter(s) have no `maxLength` constraint: `sql`. Unbounded strings let an attacker stuff arbitrary payloads through the tool, including indirect-injection content.
fix: Add a `maxLength` to each string property, or constrain with an `enum` or `pattern`. Most legitimate tool inputs fit under a few hundred bytes.
Reproduce this
Every finding above comes from a public, deterministic rule engine — no LLM in the decision path, same input always the same output. You can run it against this server yourself and get byte-identical results:
curl -fsSL capframe.ai/install | sh capframe find ./your-mcp-config.json --out findings.json
Five-step quickstart if you want the whole Find → Bind → Guard loop. If you'd rather have someone read your real tool definitions rather than the advertised surface — including the ones this public scan can't reach — that's the Agent Security Audit.
How this was scored
Source sandbox — live tools/list captured in an ephemeral Docker container (parameter schemas included → R1/R2/R4 fire). Findings are emitted by the public capframe.findings.v1 schema. Score = 100 − (10·Critical + 4·High + 2·Medium + 1·Low), clamped to [0, 100].
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