currents-mcp

npm:@currents/mcp@2.3.3

github.com/currents-dev

Score

C60

Findings

Tools

Last scan

2026-09-19

Severity breakdown

Critical0

High10

Medium0

Low0

Info0

Worst finding

Tool `currents-create-action` name implies a side effect that is not declared

· currents-create-action

`currents-create-action` looks like a side-effecting tool (its name contains a mutation verb), but its `side_effects` declaration is []. A policy synthesizer cannot produce safe rules for this tool because it cannot tell what it actually does.

fix: Declare the tool's true side effects explicitly. If the tool is genuinely read-only, rename it to match (e.g. `email.preview` rather than `email.send`).

All 10 findings

high
Tool `currents-create-action` name implies a side effect that is not declared· currents-create-actionexcessive agency
`currents-create-action` looks like a side-effecting tool (its name contains a mutation verb), but its `side_effects` declaration is []. A policy synthesizer cannot produce safe rules for this tool because it cannot tell what it actually does.
fix: Declare the tool's true side effects explicitly. If the tool is genuinely read-only, rename it to match (e.g. `email.preview` rather than `email.send`).
high
Tool `currents-update-action` name implies a side effect that is not declared· currents-update-actionexcessive agency
`currents-update-action` looks like a side-effecting tool (its name contains a mutation verb), but its `side_effects` declaration is []. A policy synthesizer cannot produce safe rules for this tool because it cannot tell what it actually does.
fix: Declare the tool's true side effects explicitly. If the tool is genuinely read-only, rename it to match (e.g. `email.preview` rather than `email.send`).
high
Tool `currents-delete-action` name implies a side effect that is not declared· currents-delete-actionexcessive agency
`currents-delete-action` looks like a side-effecting tool (its name contains a mutation verb), but its `side_effects` declaration is []. A policy synthesizer cannot produce safe rules for this tool because it cannot tell what it actually does.
fix: Declare the tool's true side effects explicitly. If the tool is genuinely read-only, rename it to match (e.g. `email.preview` rather than `email.send`).
high
Tool `currents-create-jira-issue` name implies a side effect that is not declared· currents-create-jira-issueexcessive agency
`currents-create-jira-issue` looks like a side-effecting tool (its name contains a mutation verb), but its `side_effects` declaration is []. A policy synthesizer cannot produce safe rules for this tool because it cannot tell what it actually does.
fix: Declare the tool's true side effects explicitly. If the tool is genuinely read-only, rename it to match (e.g. `email.preview` rather than `email.send`).
high
Tool `currents-cancel-run` name implies a side effect that is not declared· currents-cancel-runexcessive agency
`currents-cancel-run` looks like a side-effecting tool (its name contains a mutation verb), but its `side_effects` declaration is []. A policy synthesizer cannot produce safe rules for this tool because it cannot tell what it actually does.
fix: Declare the tool's true side effects explicitly. If the tool is genuinely read-only, rename it to match (e.g. `email.preview` rather than `email.send`).
high
Tool `currents-delete-run` name implies a side effect that is not declared· currents-delete-runexcessive agency
`currents-delete-run` looks like a side-effecting tool (its name contains a mutation verb), but its `side_effects` declaration is []. A policy synthesizer cannot produce safe rules for this tool because it cannot tell what it actually does.
fix: Declare the tool's true side effects explicitly. If the tool is genuinely read-only, rename it to match (e.g. `email.preview` rather than `email.send`).
high
Tool `currents-cancel-run-github-ci` name implies a side effect that is not declared· currents-cancel-run-github-ciexcessive agency
`currents-cancel-run-github-ci` looks like a side-effecting tool (its name contains a mutation verb), but its `side_effects` declaration is []. A policy synthesizer cannot produce safe rules for this tool because it cannot tell what it actually does.
fix: Declare the tool's true side effects explicitly. If the tool is genuinely read-only, rename it to match (e.g. `email.preview` rather than `email.send`).
high
Tool `currents-create-webhook` name implies a side effect that is not declared· currents-create-webhookexcessive agency
`currents-create-webhook` looks like a side-effecting tool (its name contains a mutation verb), but its `side_effects` declaration is []. A policy synthesizer cannot produce safe rules for this tool because it cannot tell what it actually does.
fix: Declare the tool's true side effects explicitly. If the tool is genuinely read-only, rename it to match (e.g. `email.preview` rather than `email.send`).
high
Tool `currents-update-webhook` name implies a side effect that is not declared· currents-update-webhookexcessive agency
`currents-update-webhook` looks like a side-effecting tool (its name contains a mutation verb), but its `side_effects` declaration is []. A policy synthesizer cannot produce safe rules for this tool because it cannot tell what it actually does.
fix: Declare the tool's true side effects explicitly. If the tool is genuinely read-only, rename it to match (e.g. `email.preview` rather than `email.send`).
high
Tool `currents-delete-webhook` name implies a side effect that is not declared· currents-delete-webhookexcessive agency
`currents-delete-webhook` looks like a side-effecting tool (its name contains a mutation verb), but its `side_effects` declaration is []. A policy synthesizer cannot produce safe rules for this tool because it cannot tell what it actually does.
fix: Declare the tool's true side effects explicitly. If the tool is genuinely read-only, rename it to match (e.g. `email.preview` rather than `email.send`).

Reproduce this

Every finding above comes from a public, deterministic rule engine — no LLM in the decision path, same input always the same output. You can run it against this server yourself and get byte-identical results:

curl -fsSL capframe.ai/install | sh
capframe find ./your-mcp-config.json --out findings.json

Five-step quickstart if you want the whole Find → Bind → Guard loop. If you'd rather have someone read your real tool definitions rather than the advertised surface — including the ones this public scan can't reach — that's the Agent Security Audit.

How this was scored

Source registry — tool surface extracted from the package's README + manifest (R3/R5/R6/R7 fire; schema-dependent rules deferred). Findings are emitted by the public capframe.findings.v1 schema. Score = 100 − (10·Critical + 4·High + 2·Medium + 1·Low), clamped to [0, 100].

Disagree with a finding? Open an issue.