v0.2.0 · live
CAPFRAME
§ serverhttpfindings.v2

zip1.io MCP

https://zip1.io/mcp

Score
B82
Findings
6
Tools
4
Last scan
2026-07-20

Severity breakdown

Critical0
High3
Medium3
Low0
Info0

Worst finding

Tool `create_short_url` name implies a side effect that is not declared

· create_short_url

`create_short_url` looks like a side-effecting tool (its name contains a mutation verb), but its `side_effects` declaration is []. A policy synthesizer cannot produce safe rules for this tool because it cannot tell what it actually does.

fix: Declare the tool's true side effects explicitly. If the tool is genuinely read-only, rename it to match (e.g. `email.preview` rather than `email.send`).

All 6 findings

  1. high
    Tool `create_short_url` name implies a side effect that is not declared· create_short_urlexcessive agency

    `create_short_url` looks like a side-effecting tool (its name contains a mutation verb), but its `side_effects` declaration is []. A policy synthesizer cannot produce safe rules for this tool because it cannot tell what it actually does.

    fix: Declare the tool's true side effects explicitly. If the tool is genuinely read-only, rename it to match (e.g. `email.preview` rather than `email.send`).

  2. high
    Tool `create_short_url` accepts an unconstrained URL / endpoint parameter· create_short_urlssrf surface

    The parameter(s) `url` look like URL or endpoint inputs but carry no `pattern` or `enum` constraint. An agent tricked by an indirect-injection payload can invoke this tool with an internal-service URL (e.g. `http://169.254.169.254/`) to exfiltrate cloud metadata, probe internal APIs, or pivot to services the host can reach but the caller cannot.

    fix: Constrain the URL parameter with an allow-list `enum`, or a `pattern` that restricts scheme and domain. Validate server-side against an allow-list and reject private / loopback / link-local address ranges at the HTTP client level.

  3. high
    Tool `validate_url` accepts an unconstrained URL / endpoint parameter· validate_urlssrf surface

    The parameter(s) `url` look like URL or endpoint inputs but carry no `pattern` or `enum` constraint. An agent tricked by an indirect-injection payload can invoke this tool with an internal-service URL (e.g. `http://169.254.169.254/`) to exfiltrate cloud metadata, probe internal APIs, or pivot to services the host can reach but the caller cannot.

    fix: Constrain the URL parameter with an allow-list `enum`, or a `pattern` that restricts scheme and domain. Validate server-side against an allow-list and reject private / loopback / link-local address ranges at the HTTP client level.

  4. medium
    Tool `create_short_url` accepts unconstrained string input· create_short_urlunconstrained input

    The following string parameter(s) have no `maxLength` constraint: `alias`, `description`, `expiration_time`, `password`, `url`. Unbounded strings let an attacker stuff arbitrary payloads through the tool, including indirect-injection content.

    fix: Add a `maxLength` to each string property, or constrain with an `enum` or `pattern`. Most legitimate tool inputs fit under a few hundred bytes.

  5. medium
    Tool `get_url_stats` accepts unconstrained string input· get_url_statsunconstrained input

    The following string parameter(s) have no `maxLength` constraint: `short_code`. Unbounded strings let an attacker stuff arbitrary payloads through the tool, including indirect-injection content.

    fix: Add a `maxLength` to each string property, or constrain with an `enum` or `pattern`. Most legitimate tool inputs fit under a few hundred bytes.

  6. medium
    Tool `validate_url` accepts unconstrained string input· validate_urlunconstrained input

    The following string parameter(s) have no `maxLength` constraint: `url`. Unbounded strings let an attacker stuff arbitrary payloads through the tool, including indirect-injection content.

    fix: Add a `maxLength` to each string property, or constrain with an `enum` or `pattern`. Most legitimate tool inputs fit under a few hundred bytes.

How this was scored

Source http live HTTP MCP endpoint, classified against every rule. Findings are emitted by the public capframe.findings.v1 schema. Score = 100 − (10·Critical + 4·High + 2·Medium + 1·Low), clamped to [0, 100].

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