Javadocs.dev MCP
https://www.javadocs.dev/mcp
Severity breakdown
Worst finding
Tool `get_latest_version` accepts unconstrained string input
· get_latest_version
The following string parameter(s) have no `maxLength` constraint: `artifactId`, `groupId`. Unbounded strings let an attacker stuff arbitrary payloads through the tool, including indirect-injection content.
fix: Add a `maxLength` to each string property, or constrain with an `enum` or `pattern`. Most legitimate tool inputs fit under a few hundred bytes.
All 13 findings
- mediumTool `get_latest_version` accepts unconstrained string input· get_latest_versionunconstrained input
The following string parameter(s) have no `maxLength` constraint: `artifactId`, `groupId`. Unbounded strings let an attacker stuff arbitrary payloads through the tool, including indirect-injection content.
fix: Add a `maxLength` to each string property, or constrain with an `enum` or `pattern`. Most legitimate tool inputs fit under a few hundred bytes.
- mediumTool `get_latest_version` description mentions money but no `money` side-effect is declared· get_latest_versionexcessive agency
Description: "Resolves the latest published version of a Maven Central artifact (any groupId:artifactId — Java, Kotlin, or Scala library). Call this first when you only know the artifact but not the version: the version it returns feeds into every other tool here that takes a concrete version. By default it returns the latest release, sorted by Maven version order and skipping pre-releases; set `includePreReleases` to true to get the newest version of any kind (milestone, RC, beta...), e.g. when a class or method you are looking for is missing from the latest release. Works against the live Maven Central catalog — no local install, build tool, or repository checkout required." -- this references money/payment/refund/etc., but the declared side_effects ([]) don't include `money`. A capframe-bind policy that relies on declared side_effects to scope spend caveats will under-scope this tool.
fix: Add `money` to the tool's `side_effects` declaration, or rewrite the description to clarify that no actual money moves.
- mediumTool `get_javadoc_index` accepts unconstrained string input· get_javadoc_indexunconstrained input
The following string parameter(s) have no `maxLength` constraint: `artifactId`, `groupId`, `version`. Unbounded strings let an attacker stuff arbitrary payloads through the tool, including indirect-injection content.
fix: Add a `maxLength` to each string property, or constrain with an `enum` or `pattern`. Most legitimate tool inputs fit under a few hundred bytes.
- mediumTool `get_javadoc_index` fetches external web content -- indirect-injection surface· get_javadoc_indexindirect injection
Description: "Fetches the rendered Javadoc/Scaladoc index page for a specific Maven Central artifact version, converted to plain text/markdown. Useful for orienting yourself in an unfamiliar library: it lists the top-level packages, modules, and (for Scaladoc) often a curated overview. Use this before drilling into specific symbols. Works against the live Maven Central catalog — you do not need to download the javadoc jar." -- this tool pulls externally-controlled content into the agent's context window, the canonical indirect-injection vector. Even when the user supplies the URL, content at that URL can carry hostile instructions.
fix: Sandbox the fetched content: strip prompts before forwarding to the model, constrain to an allow-list of domains, and route through capframe-guard with a `domain in [...]` caveat.
- mediumTool `list_javadoc_symbols` accepts unconstrained string input· list_javadoc_symbolsunconstrained input
The following string parameter(s) have no `maxLength` constraint: `artifactId`, `filter`, `groupId`, `version`. Unbounded strings let an attacker stuff arbitrary payloads through the tool, including indirect-injection content.
fix: Add a `maxLength` to each string property, or constrain with an `enum` or `pattern`. Most legitimate tool inputs fit under a few hundred bytes.
- mediumTool `list_javadoc_symbols` description mentions money but no `money` side-effect is declared· list_javadoc_symbolsexcessive agency
Description: "Enumerates the public API a library documents — classes, interfaces, traits, objects, enums, and annotations — for a Maven Central artifact version. Each entry includes the fully-qualified class name (`fqn`) and a `link` that can be passed to get_javadoc_symbol to read the rendered API documentation. Use this to answer 'which classes/types does library X have?' or 'find classes related to <topic>' — it is the fastest way to list the API by name without reading code. Prefer this over list_source_files whenever you only need class/type names. Pass `filter` (e.g. a class name) to get only the matching entries: large libraries list hundreds of symbols, so filtering saves a lot of context when you are looking for one type. Only if this returns NotFoundError because no javadoc jar was published, or an empty list because the published jar is empty, fall back to list_source_files. Works against the live Maven Central catalog with no local install, build, or checkout required." -- this references money/payment/refund/etc., but the declared side_effects ([]) don't include `money`. A capframe-bind policy that relies on declared side_effects to scope spend caveats will under-scope this tool.
fix: Add `money` to the tool's `side_effects` declaration, or rewrite the description to clarify that no actual money moves.
- mediumTool `get_javadoc_symbol` accepts unconstrained string input· get_javadoc_symbolunconstrained input
The following string parameter(s) have no `maxLength` constraint: `artifactId`, `groupId`, `link`, `version`. Unbounded strings let an attacker stuff arbitrary payloads through the tool, including indirect-injection content.
fix: Add a `maxLength` to each string property, or constrain with an `enum` or `pattern`. Most legitimate tool inputs fit under a few hundred bytes.
- mediumTool `get_source_file` accepts unconstrained string input· get_source_fileunconstrained input
The following string parameter(s) have no `maxLength` constraint: `artifactId`, `grep`, `groupId`, `link`, `version`. Unbounded strings let an attacker stuff arbitrary payloads through the tool, including indirect-injection content.
fix: Add a `maxLength` to each string property, or constrain with an `enum` or `pattern`. Most legitimate tool inputs fit under a few hundred bytes.
- mediumTool `get_source_file` description mentions money but no `money` side-effect is declared· get_source_fileexcessive agency
Description: "Reads one source file from a Maven Central library's sources jar (the `-sources.jar` artifact). Pass the `link` value returned by list_source_files. Use this whenever you need the exact source text of a JVM library — tracing behavior into a dependency, confirming a public API's implementation, finding a definition, or comparing two library versions. Strongly preferred over locating the jar in a local build cache and unzipping it: it works for any Maven Central artifact, no local checkout or build needed. Large files (list_source_files gives each file's `sizeBytes`; over about 20000 bytes) can exceed your tool-output limit: pass `grep` to find the lines you need (each result line is numbered), then `startLine`/`endLine` to read the surrounding code. Without them the whole file is returned." -- this references money/payment/refund/etc., but the declared side_effects ([]) don't include `money`. A capframe-bind policy that relies on declared side_effects to scope spend caveats will under-scope this tool.
fix: Add `money` to the tool's `side_effects` declaration, or rewrite the description to clarify that no actual money moves.
- mediumTool `list_source_files` accepts unconstrained string input· list_source_filesunconstrained input
The following string parameter(s) have no `maxLength` constraint: `artifactId`, `groupId`, `version`. Unbounded strings let an attacker stuff arbitrary payloads through the tool, including indirect-injection content.
fix: Add a `maxLength` to each string property, or constrain with an `enum` or `pattern`. Most legitimate tool inputs fit under a few hundred bytes.
- mediumTool `list_source_files` description mentions money but no `money` side-effect is declared· list_source_filesexcessive agency
Description: "Lists the raw source files (`.java`, `.kt`, and `.scala`) in a Maven Central artifact version's `-sources.jar`. Each entry's `link` can be passed to get_source_file to read the actual source code, and its `sizeBytes` tells you whether to read the whole file or only part of it (with get_source_file's `grep` or line range). Use this only when you need the implementation — for example, to trace behavior or see how something is wired. To discover which classes exist, or to find classes by topic or name, use list_javadoc_symbols instead; do not use this tool just to enumerate classes. Works against the live Maven Central catalog with no local install, build, or checkout required." -- this references money/payment/refund/etc., but the declared side_effects ([]) don't include `money`. A capframe-bind policy that relies on declared side_effects to scope spend caveats will under-scope this tool.
fix: Add `money` to the tool's `side_effects` declaration, or rewrite the description to clarify that no actual money moves.
- mediumTool `search_artifacts` accepts unconstrained string input· search_artifactsunconstrained input
The following string parameter(s) have no `maxLength` constraint: `query`. Unbounded strings let an attacker stuff arbitrary payloads through the tool, including indirect-injection content.
fix: Add a `maxLength` to each string property, or constrain with an `enum` or `pattern`. Most legitimate tool inputs fit under a few hundred bytes.
- mediumTool `symbol_to_artifact` accepts unconstrained string input· symbol_to_artifactunconstrained input
The following string parameter(s) have no `maxLength` constraint: `query`. Unbounded strings let an attacker stuff arbitrary payloads through the tool, including indirect-injection content.
fix: Add a `maxLength` to each string property, or constrain with an `enum` or `pattern`. Most legitimate tool inputs fit under a few hundred bytes.
Reproduce this
Every finding above comes from a public, deterministic rule engine — no LLM in the decision path, same input always the same output. You can run it against this server yourself and get byte-identical results:
curl -fsSL capframe.ai/install | sh capframe find ./your-mcp-config.json --out findings.json
Five-step quickstart if you want the whole Find → Bind → Guard loop. If you'd rather have someone read your real tool definitions rather than the advertised surface — including the ones this public scan can't reach — that's the Agent Security Audit.
How this was scored
Source http — live HTTP MCP endpoint, classified against every rule. Findings are emitted by the public capframe.findings.v1 schema. Score = 100 − (10·Critical + 4·High + 2·Medium + 1·Low), clamped to [0, 100].
Disagree with a finding? Open an issue.