Roundtable MCP
https://mcp.roundtable.now/mcp
Severity breakdown
Worst finding
Tool `set-thread-visibility` name implies a side effect that is not declared
· set-thread-visibility
`set-thread-visibility` looks like a side-effecting tool (its name contains a mutation verb), but its `side_effects` declaration is []. A policy synthesizer cannot produce safe rules for this tool because it cannot tell what it actually does.
fix: Declare the tool's true side effects explicitly. If the tool is genuinely read-only, rename it to match (e.g. `email.preview` rather than `email.send`).
All 18 findings
- highTool `set-thread-visibility` name implies a side effect that is not declared· set-thread-visibilityexcessive agency
`set-thread-visibility` looks like a side-effecting tool (its name contains a mutation verb), but its `side_effects` declaration is []. A policy synthesizer cannot produce safe rules for this tool because it cannot tell what it actually does.
fix: Declare the tool's true side effects explicitly. If the tool is genuinely read-only, rename it to match (e.g. `email.preview` rather than `email.send`).
- highTool `consult-council` accepts an unconstrained URL / endpoint parameter· consult-councilssrf surface
The parameter(s) `webhook_url` look like URL or endpoint inputs but carry no `pattern` or `enum` constraint. An agent tricked by an indirect-injection payload can invoke this tool with an internal-service URL (e.g. `http://169.254.169.254/`) to exfiltrate cloud metadata, probe internal APIs, or pivot to services the host can reach but the caller cannot.
fix: Constrain the URL parameter with an allow-list `enum`, or a `pattern` that restricts scheme and domain. Validate server-side against an allow-list and reject private / loopback / link-local address ranges at the HTTP client level.
- highTool `design-architecture` accepts an unconstrained URL / endpoint parameter· design-architecturessrf surface
The parameter(s) `webhook_url` look like URL or endpoint inputs but carry no `pattern` or `enum` constraint. An agent tricked by an indirect-injection payload can invoke this tool with an internal-service URL (e.g. `http://169.254.169.254/`) to exfiltrate cloud metadata, probe internal APIs, or pivot to services the host can reach but the caller cannot.
fix: Constrain the URL parameter with an allow-list `enum`, or a `pattern` that restricts scheme and domain. Validate server-side against an allow-list and reject private / loopback / link-local address ranges at the HTTP client level.
- highTool `review-code` accepts an unconstrained URL / endpoint parameter· review-codessrf surface
The parameter(s) `webhook_url` look like URL or endpoint inputs but carry no `pattern` or `enum` constraint. An agent tricked by an indirect-injection payload can invoke this tool with an internal-service URL (e.g. `http://169.254.169.254/`) to exfiltrate cloud metadata, probe internal APIs, or pivot to services the host can reach but the caller cannot.
fix: Constrain the URL parameter with an allow-list `enum`, or a `pattern` that restricts scheme and domain. Validate server-side against an allow-list and reject private / loopback / link-local address ranges at the HTTP client level.
- highTool `plan-implementation` accepts an unconstrained URL / endpoint parameter· plan-implementationssrf surface
The parameter(s) `webhook_url` look like URL or endpoint inputs but carry no `pattern` or `enum` constraint. An agent tricked by an indirect-injection payload can invoke this tool with an internal-service URL (e.g. `http://169.254.169.254/`) to exfiltrate cloud metadata, probe internal APIs, or pivot to services the host can reach but the caller cannot.
fix: Constrain the URL parameter with an allow-list `enum`, or a `pattern` that restricts scheme and domain. Validate server-side against an allow-list and reject private / loopback / link-local address ranges at the HTTP client level.
- highTool `debug-issue` accepts an unconstrained URL / endpoint parameter· debug-issuessrf surface
The parameter(s) `webhook_url` look like URL or endpoint inputs but carry no `pattern` or `enum` constraint. An agent tricked by an indirect-injection payload can invoke this tool with an internal-service URL (e.g. `http://169.254.169.254/`) to exfiltrate cloud metadata, probe internal APIs, or pivot to services the host can reach but the caller cannot.
fix: Constrain the URL parameter with an allow-list `enum`, or a `pattern` that restricts scheme and domain. Validate server-side against an allow-list and reject private / loopback / link-local address ranges at the HTTP client level.
- highTool `assess-tradeoffs` accepts an unconstrained URL / endpoint parameter· assess-tradeoffsssrf surface
The parameter(s) `webhook_url` look like URL or endpoint inputs but carry no `pattern` or `enum` constraint. An agent tricked by an indirect-injection payload can invoke this tool with an internal-service URL (e.g. `http://169.254.169.254/`) to exfiltrate cloud metadata, probe internal APIs, or pivot to services the host can reach but the caller cannot.
fix: Constrain the URL parameter with an allow-list `enum`, or a `pattern` that restricts scheme and domain. Validate server-side against an allow-list and reject private / loopback / link-local address ranges at the HTTP client level.
- mediumTool `list-sessions` accepts unconstrained string input· list-sessionsunconstrained input
The following string parameter(s) have no `maxLength` constraint: `tool_name`. Unbounded strings let an attacker stuff arbitrary payloads through the tool, including indirect-injection content.
fix: Add a `maxLength` to each string property, or constrain with an `enum` or `pattern`. Most legitimate tool inputs fit under a few hundred bytes.
- mediumTool `get-session` accepts unconstrained string input· get-sessionunconstrained input
The following string parameter(s) have no `maxLength` constraint: `session_id`. Unbounded strings let an attacker stuff arbitrary payloads through the tool, including indirect-injection content.
fix: Add a `maxLength` to each string property, or constrain with an `enum` or `pattern`. Most legitimate tool inputs fit under a few hundred bytes.
- mediumTool `get-logs` accepts unconstrained string input· get-logsunconstrained input
The following string parameter(s) have no `maxLength` constraint: `event`, `session_id`. Unbounded strings let an attacker stuff arbitrary payloads through the tool, including indirect-injection content.
fix: Add a `maxLength` to each string property, or constrain with an `enum` or `pattern`. Most legitimate tool inputs fit under a few hundred bytes.
- mediumTool `get-thread-link` accepts unconstrained string input· get-thread-linkunconstrained input
The following string parameter(s) have no `maxLength` constraint: `session_id`. Unbounded strings let an attacker stuff arbitrary payloads through the tool, including indirect-injection content.
fix: Add a `maxLength` to each string property, or constrain with an `enum` or `pattern`. Most legitimate tool inputs fit under a few hundred bytes.
- mediumTool `set-thread-visibility` accepts unconstrained string input· set-thread-visibilityunconstrained input
The following string parameter(s) have no `maxLength` constraint: `session_id`. Unbounded strings let an attacker stuff arbitrary payloads through the tool, including indirect-injection content.
fix: Add a `maxLength` to each string property, or constrain with an `enum` or `pattern`. Most legitimate tool inputs fit under a few hundred bytes.
- mediumTool `consult-council` accepts unconstrained string input· consult-councilunconstrained input
The following string parameter(s) have no `maxLength` constraint: `webhook_url`. Unbounded strings let an attacker stuff arbitrary payloads through the tool, including indirect-injection content.
fix: Add a `maxLength` to each string property, or constrain with an `enum` or `pattern`. Most legitimate tool inputs fit under a few hundred bytes.
- mediumTool `design-architecture` accepts unconstrained string input· design-architectureunconstrained input
The following string parameter(s) have no `maxLength` constraint: `webhook_url`. Unbounded strings let an attacker stuff arbitrary payloads through the tool, including indirect-injection content.
fix: Add a `maxLength` to each string property, or constrain with an `enum` or `pattern`. Most legitimate tool inputs fit under a few hundred bytes.
- mediumTool `review-code` accepts unconstrained string input· review-codeunconstrained input
The following string parameter(s) have no `maxLength` constraint: `language`, `webhook_url`. Unbounded strings let an attacker stuff arbitrary payloads through the tool, including indirect-injection content.
fix: Add a `maxLength` to each string property, or constrain with an `enum` or `pattern`. Most legitimate tool inputs fit under a few hundred bytes.
- mediumTool `plan-implementation` accepts unconstrained string input· plan-implementationunconstrained input
The following string parameter(s) have no `maxLength` constraint: `webhook_url`. Unbounded strings let an attacker stuff arbitrary payloads through the tool, including indirect-injection content.
fix: Add a `maxLength` to each string property, or constrain with an `enum` or `pattern`. Most legitimate tool inputs fit under a few hundred bytes.
- mediumTool `debug-issue` accepts unconstrained string input· debug-issueunconstrained input
The following string parameter(s) have no `maxLength` constraint: `webhook_url`. Unbounded strings let an attacker stuff arbitrary payloads through the tool, including indirect-injection content.
fix: Add a `maxLength` to each string property, or constrain with an `enum` or `pattern`. Most legitimate tool inputs fit under a few hundred bytes.
- mediumTool `assess-tradeoffs` accepts unconstrained string input· assess-tradeoffsunconstrained input
The following string parameter(s) have no `maxLength` constraint: `webhook_url`. Unbounded strings let an attacker stuff arbitrary payloads through the tool, including indirect-injection content.
fix: Add a `maxLength` to each string property, or constrain with an `enum` or `pattern`. Most legitimate tool inputs fit under a few hundred bytes.
How this was scored
Source http — live HTTP MCP endpoint, classified against every rule. Findings are emitted by the public capframe.findings.v1 schema. Score = 100 − (10·Critical + 4·High + 2·Medium + 1·Low), clamped to [0, 100].
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