v0.2.0 · live
CAPFRAME
§ serverhttpfindings.v2

OpenZeppelin Cairo Contracts MCP

https://mcp.openzeppelin.com/contracts/cairo/mcp

Score
C78
Findings
9
Tools
8
Last scan
2026-07-20

Severity breakdown

Critical0
High2
Medium7
Low0
Info0

Worst finding

Tool `cairo-erc721` accepts an unconstrained URL / endpoint parameter

· cairo-erc721

The parameter(s) `baseUri` look like URL or endpoint inputs but carry no `pattern` or `enum` constraint. An agent tricked by an indirect-injection payload can invoke this tool with an internal-service URL (e.g. `http://169.254.169.254/`) to exfiltrate cloud metadata, probe internal APIs, or pivot to services the host can reach but the caller cannot.

fix: Constrain the URL parameter with an allow-list `enum`, or a `pattern` that restricts scheme and domain. Validate server-side against an allow-list and reject private / loopback / link-local address ranges at the HTTP client level.

All 9 findings

  1. high
    Tool `cairo-erc721` accepts an unconstrained URL / endpoint parameter· cairo-erc721ssrf surface

    The parameter(s) `baseUri` look like URL or endpoint inputs but carry no `pattern` or `enum` constraint. An agent tricked by an indirect-injection payload can invoke this tool with an internal-service URL (e.g. `http://169.254.169.254/`) to exfiltrate cloud metadata, probe internal APIs, or pivot to services the host can reach but the caller cannot.

    fix: Constrain the URL parameter with an allow-list `enum`, or a `pattern` that restricts scheme and domain. Validate server-side against an allow-list and reject private / loopback / link-local address ranges at the HTTP client level.

  2. high
    Tool `cairo-erc1155` accepts an unconstrained URL / endpoint parameter· cairo-erc1155ssrf surface

    The parameter(s) `baseUri` look like URL or endpoint inputs but carry no `pattern` or `enum` constraint. An agent tricked by an indirect-injection payload can invoke this tool with an internal-service URL (e.g. `http://169.254.169.254/`) to exfiltrate cloud metadata, probe internal APIs, or pivot to services the host can reach but the caller cannot.

    fix: Constrain the URL parameter with an allow-list `enum`, or a `pattern` that restricts scheme and domain. Validate server-side against an allow-list and reject private / loopback / link-local address ranges at the HTTP client level.

  3. medium
    Tool `cairo-erc20` accepts unconstrained string input· cairo-erc20unconstrained input

    The following string parameter(s) have no `maxLength` constraint: `appName`, `appVersion`, `decimals`, `name`, `premint`, `symbol`. Unbounded strings let an attacker stuff arbitrary payloads through the tool, including indirect-injection content.

    fix: Add a `maxLength` to each string property, or constrain with an `enum` or `pattern`. Most legitimate tool inputs fit under a few hundred bytes.

  4. medium
    Tool `cairo-erc721` accepts unconstrained string input· cairo-erc721unconstrained input

    The following string parameter(s) have no `maxLength` constraint: `appName`, `appVersion`, `baseUri`, `name`, `symbol`. Unbounded strings let an attacker stuff arbitrary payloads through the tool, including indirect-injection content.

    fix: Add a `maxLength` to each string property, or constrain with an `enum` or `pattern`. Most legitimate tool inputs fit under a few hundred bytes.

  5. medium
    Tool `cairo-erc1155` accepts unconstrained string input· cairo-erc1155unconstrained input

    The following string parameter(s) have no `maxLength` constraint: `baseUri`, `name`. Unbounded strings let an attacker stuff arbitrary payloads through the tool, including indirect-injection content.

    fix: Add a `maxLength` to each string property, or constrain with an `enum` or `pattern`. Most legitimate tool inputs fit under a few hundred bytes.

  6. medium
    Tool `cairo-account` accepts unconstrained string input· cairo-accountunconstrained input

    The following string parameter(s) have no `maxLength` constraint: `name`. Unbounded strings let an attacker stuff arbitrary payloads through the tool, including indirect-injection content.

    fix: Add a `maxLength` to each string property, or constrain with an `enum` or `pattern`. Most legitimate tool inputs fit under a few hundred bytes.

  7. medium
    Tool `cairo-multisig` accepts unconstrained string input· cairo-multisigunconstrained input

    The following string parameter(s) have no `maxLength` constraint: `name`, `quorum`. Unbounded strings let an attacker stuff arbitrary payloads through the tool, including indirect-injection content.

    fix: Add a `maxLength` to each string property, or constrain with an `enum` or `pattern`. Most legitimate tool inputs fit under a few hundred bytes.

  8. medium
    Tool `cairo-vesting` accepts unconstrained string input· cairo-vestingunconstrained input

    The following string parameter(s) have no `maxLength` constraint: `cliffDuration`, `duration`, `name`, `startDate`. Unbounded strings let an attacker stuff arbitrary payloads through the tool, including indirect-injection content.

    fix: Add a `maxLength` to each string property, or constrain with an `enum` or `pattern`. Most legitimate tool inputs fit under a few hundred bytes.

  9. medium
    Tool `cairo-custom` accepts unconstrained string input· cairo-customunconstrained input

    The following string parameter(s) have no `maxLength` constraint: `name`. Unbounded strings let an attacker stuff arbitrary payloads through the tool, including indirect-injection content.

    fix: Add a `maxLength` to each string property, or constrain with an `enum` or `pattern`. Most legitimate tool inputs fit under a few hundred bytes.

How this was scored

Source http live HTTP MCP endpoint, classified against every rule. Findings are emitted by the public capframe.findings.v1 schema. Score = 100 − (10·Critical + 4·High + 2·Medium + 1·Low), clamped to [0, 100].

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