v0.2.0 · live
CAPFRAME
§ serverhttpfindings.v2

GitMCP

https://gitmcp.io/docs

github.com/idosal/git-mcp

Score
B86
Findings
6
Tools
5
Last scan
2026-07-20

Severity breakdown

Critical0
High1
Medium5
Low0
Info0

Worst finding

Tool `fetch_generic_url_content` accepts an unconstrained URL / endpoint parameter

· fetch_generic_url_content

The parameter(s) `url` look like URL or endpoint inputs but carry no `pattern` or `enum` constraint. An agent tricked by an indirect-injection payload can invoke this tool with an internal-service URL (e.g. `http://169.254.169.254/`) to exfiltrate cloud metadata, probe internal APIs, or pivot to services the host can reach but the caller cannot.

fix: Constrain the URL parameter with an allow-list `enum`, or a `pattern` that restricts scheme and domain. Validate server-side against an allow-list and reject private / loopback / link-local address ranges at the HTTP client level.

All 6 findings

  1. high
    Tool `fetch_generic_url_content` accepts an unconstrained URL / endpoint parameter· fetch_generic_url_contentssrf surface

    The parameter(s) `url` look like URL or endpoint inputs but carry no `pattern` or `enum` constraint. An agent tricked by an indirect-injection payload can invoke this tool with an internal-service URL (e.g. `http://169.254.169.254/`) to exfiltrate cloud metadata, probe internal APIs, or pivot to services the host can reach but the caller cannot.

    fix: Constrain the URL parameter with an allow-list `enum`, or a `pattern` that restricts scheme and domain. Validate server-side against an allow-list and reject private / loopback / link-local address ranges at the HTTP client level.

  2. medium
    Tool `match_common_libs_owner_repo_mapping` accepts unconstrained string input· match_common_libs_owner_repo_mappingunconstrained input

    The following string parameter(s) have no `maxLength` constraint: `library`. Unbounded strings let an attacker stuff arbitrary payloads through the tool, including indirect-injection content.

    fix: Add a `maxLength` to each string property, or constrain with an `enum` or `pattern`. Most legitimate tool inputs fit under a few hundred bytes.

  3. medium
    Tool `fetch_generic_documentation` accepts unconstrained string input· fetch_generic_documentationunconstrained input

    The following string parameter(s) have no `maxLength` constraint: `owner`, `repo`. Unbounded strings let an attacker stuff arbitrary payloads through the tool, including indirect-injection content.

    fix: Add a `maxLength` to each string property, or constrain with an `enum` or `pattern`. Most legitimate tool inputs fit under a few hundred bytes.

  4. medium
    Tool `search_generic_documentation` accepts unconstrained string input· search_generic_documentationunconstrained input

    The following string parameter(s) have no `maxLength` constraint: `owner`, `query`, `repo`. Unbounded strings let an attacker stuff arbitrary payloads through the tool, including indirect-injection content.

    fix: Add a `maxLength` to each string property, or constrain with an `enum` or `pattern`. Most legitimate tool inputs fit under a few hundred bytes.

  5. medium
    Tool `search_generic_code` accepts unconstrained string input· search_generic_codeunconstrained input

    The following string parameter(s) have no `maxLength` constraint: `owner`, `query`, `repo`. Unbounded strings let an attacker stuff arbitrary payloads through the tool, including indirect-injection content.

    fix: Add a `maxLength` to each string property, or constrain with an `enum` or `pattern`. Most legitimate tool inputs fit under a few hundred bytes.

  6. medium
    Tool `fetch_generic_url_content` accepts unconstrained string input· fetch_generic_url_contentunconstrained input

    The following string parameter(s) have no `maxLength` constraint: `url`. Unbounded strings let an attacker stuff arbitrary payloads through the tool, including indirect-injection content.

    fix: Add a `maxLength` to each string property, or constrain with an `enum` or `pattern`. Most legitimate tool inputs fit under a few hundred bytes.

How this was scored

Source http live HTTP MCP endpoint, classified against every rule. Findings are emitted by the public capframe.findings.v1 schema. Score = 100 − (10·Critical + 4·High + 2·Medium + 1·Low), clamped to [0, 100].

Disagree with a finding? Open an issue.